Three numbers for the same company, all defensible, all built differently. The analyst's job isn't to declare a winner — it's to explain every euro of the gap, decide which number to trust, and act on it. This is where the whole case pays off.
Each number answers a different question. The reported NNNAV is what the company's auditors signed off at year-end. Your NAV is what the assets are worth on an independent, current revaluation. The share price is what the market will actually pay today. Reconciling them is the analyst's real product.
Work down the ladder. The components are given; compute the two euro gaps (book→analyst and analyst→market) and check against your build.
| Reported NNNAV — FY2008 year-end | €13.03 |
| − Vintage & revaluation: 9 months of disposals, rent erosion and further yield expansion to Q3-2009, plus your independent stabilised cap-rate discipline | — |
| = Your analyst NAV — Q3-2009 | €10.09 |
| − Market discount: refinancing risk near the 60% LTV covenant, frozen 2009 credit market, sentiment & liquidity | — |
| = Share price | €8.20 |
You started with an audited €13.03 NNNAV and never took it on trust. You rebuilt the property on your stabilised NOI and a cap rate you defended from first principles; you took only the development margin, not the headline finished value; you carried a floating loan book at par and parked the swap mark where it belongs. The result — ~€10.1 — sits a fifth below the reported book, mostly because the book was nine months stale, and a further fifth above the market price, which is pricing real refinancing risk.
The edge wasn't being bearish. By December 2008 the appraiser had already written the portfolio to a 5.9% yield. The analyst's edge was reaching that conclusion against the 2Q08 peak ~5.0% valuation — ahead of the mark — and then holding a disciplined number while the market overshot to the downside. Same method works for a US-GAAP REIT; there's just no reported NAV to reconcile against.